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INTRODUCTION
In a much-awaited decision, the Supreme Court determined that fed-
eral preemption did not apply to a state failure-to-warn claim for a
prescription drug.' The Wyeth v. Levine decision addressed a question
that has caused much commotion and consternation in courts and among
legal professionals and scholars2 and understandably so-preemption
issues are the "fiercest battle in products liability litigation today."3 Just a
few days after issuing the Levine decision, the Supreme Court also va-
cated and remanded a similar Third Circuit decision, Colacicco v.
Apotex Like Levine, Colacicco addressed preemption for prescription
drugs. Colacicco included both branded and generic pharmaceutical
companies as defendants, whereas the sole defendant, Wyeth, in Levine
was a pharmaceutical company that manufactures and sells branded
drugs.5
While it is clear that state failure-to-warn claims can no longer be
preempted by federal approval of a branded prescription drug label, the
Levine and Colacicco holdings do not clearly prevent generic manufac-
turers from claiming preemption. The Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) regulates both branded and generic drugs, but does so under sepa-
rate statutory and regulatory provisions. Originally, the FDA evaluated
generic drugs just as they did branded products.
Uniform evaluation stopped as a result of Congress' concern over
high pharmaceutical costs. In an effort to increase the availability of
lower cost, generic drugs in the marketplace, Congress enacted the
Hatch-Waxman Act . As anticipated, the Act increased the market pres-
1. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009).
2. E.g., Posting of Jim Beck to Drug and Device Law, http://
druganddevicelaw.blogspot.com/2007/12/supreme-courts-preemption-trilogy.html (Dec. 8, 2007,
13:32 EST) (recognizing that Wyeth v. Levine would solve an issue that federal appellate and
state courts wrestle with frequently). But see, e.g., Lars Noah, Platitudes About "Product
Stewardship" in Torts: Continuing Drug Research and Education, .15 MICH. TELECOmm.
TECH. L. REV 359, 361 n.3 (2009) (explaining that Wyeth v. Levine "fail[s] to foreclose alto-
gether the possibility that such a tort claim might conflict with a more clearly expressed FDA
labeling requirement").
3. Catherine M. Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption: An Institutional Approach,
76 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 449,450 (2009).
4. Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1578 (2009).
5. Wyeth currently sells some generic drugs, but the Levine case dealt only with its
branded, non-generic product, Phenergan. Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1191.
6. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. 355 (2009) and 35 U.S.C.
271 (d)-(h) (2009)) [hereinafter Hatch-Waxman Act].
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ence of generic drugs. Recent summaries show that "10,072 of the
12,751 drugs listed in the FDA's Orange Book have generic counter-
parts."' 8 In order to achieve this goal, the Act permits generic drug
manufacturers to submit a smaller collection of information prior to re-
ceiving the FDA's permission to market a new generic drug. For
example, generic manufacturers need not submit clinical safety and effi-
cacy data. Rather, the FDA requires generic manufactures to make
showings of similarity between its generic drug and the branded drug it
seeks to supplement.9 This requirement also dictates generic manufactur-
ers to duplicate the labeling of the branded drug. By relying on the
branded drug's clinical data, the generic manufacturer forfeits all control
over the safety and efficacy warnings.
If a generic manufacturer does not have control over its safety warn-
ings, can it comply with the obligations posed by state tort liability?
State failure-to-warn actions evaluate whether a product manufacturer
has met its obligation to warn consumers about known dangers associ-
ated with its product. In essence, if a manufacturer knows about a
potentially dangerous outcome, it has a duty to warn its consumers. If
the generic manufacturer can comply with a state duty to warn only by
changing a label that the FDA will not allow it to change, it becomes
impossible for the corporation to meet both requirements. This impossi-
bility indicates that conflict preemption applies and the generic
manufacturer ought not to be liable for claims arising under state tort
law.'° This situation is distinct from branded pharmaceutical manufactur-
ers who do have the ability to control and modify their safety labels.
Part I begins by examining the doctrine of preemption, considering
state tort liability and federal preemption theories. Part II reviews recent
Supreme Court jurisprudence relevant to pharmaceutical preemption.
Part III then looks at how generic drugs fit into the preemption landscape
and concludes that preemption applies to generic drugs. Finally, Part IV
evaluates the implications of preemption within the generic drug context.
7. Douglas A. Robinson, Note, Recent Administrative Reforms of the Hatch-Waxman
Act: Lower Prices Now in Exchange for Less Pharmaceutical Innovation Later?, 81 WASH. U.
L.Q. 829, 831 (2003).
8. Generic Pharmaceutical Organization, Facts at a Glance, http://www.
gphaonline.org/about-gpha/about-generics/facts (last visited May 4, 2009). The FDA's Orange
Book lists drug products that are approved on the basis of safety and effectiveness under Sec-
tion 505 of the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act. FDA, Center for Food and Drug Administration,
Drug Information, http://www.fda.gov/cder/orange/default.htm (last visited May 4, 2009).
9. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2009) (requiring, among other things, a showing of identical
active ingredients, bioequivalence, and labeling).
10. For general information on conflict preemption, see generally 16 AM. JUR. 2o Con-
stitutional Law § 55 (2009); 16A Am. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 234 (2009).
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I. FEDERAL PREEMPTION
Identifying the reach of federal regulations is difficult in products li-
ability where strong arguments exist both for national uniform standards
and, alternately, for more localized, state-based approaches." This diffi-
culty is compounded when state common-law and federal regulatory
systems address similar problems.' 2 State tort law plays a role in drug
regulation, if not by promoting drug safety, at least by serving "a com-
pensatory function distinct from federal regulation."' 3 This section
outlines state failure-to-warn claims and then considers these claims in
the context of federal preemption.
A. State Failure-to-Warn Claims
Liability can arise for a manufacturer when one of its products
causes injury. Products liability exists "to insure that the costs of injuries
resulting from defective products are borne by the manufacturers that put
such products on the market rather than by the injured persons who are
powerless to protect themselves.' 4 Although having its origins in com-
mon law, products liability is now, in many states, supplemented or
replaced by statutes."
Failure-to-warn claims, a type of products liability, look to whether a
manufacturer adequately warned of dangers associated with its product.
To determine what dangers must be included in a warning to consumers,
a manufacturer must consider a number of issues, including the "extent
of the risk, the likelihood that it will arise, the user's likely understand-
ing about the danger, the means available to convey a warning, the
likelihood that too many warnings will decrease the effectiveness of
each, and other factors ....,,6 As evinced by the range of factors that
must be considered, the duty to warn is predicated on the superior
knowledge of the manufacturer. 7 Liability arises when, despite its supe-
rior knowledge, the manufacturer abdicates its responsibility to provide
11. Sharkey, supra note 3, at 452-53.
12. Id. at 452.
13. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1193 (2009) (referencing the state trial court
opinion).
14. Greenman v. Yuba Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897,901 (Cal. 1963). Greenman is consid-
ered the seminal case on strict liability for product defects. JOSEPH W. GLANNON, THE LAW OF
TORTS 288 (3d ed. 2005).
15. GLANNON, supra note 14, at 297.
16. GLANNON, supra note 14, at 295.
17. 1-6 PRODUCTS LIABILITY GUIDE § 6.03(4)(c)(MB)(2009).
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adequate warnings and thereby causes harm through having made its
product unreasonably dangerous.'8
The rationale supporting products liability-to insure manufacturers
bear the costs of injurious products-logically applies to pharmaceutical
manufacturers just as it does to manufacturers in other industries. A
branded drug is manufactured by a pharmaceutical company only after
extensive research and thorough testing. This comprehensive process
leads directly to the superior knowledge on which the duty to warn is
predicated. Generic manufacturers, on the other hand, undertake limited
research and development efforts. 9 If the duty to warn is based on the
existence of superior knowledge, it is possible that this limited knowl-
edge base creates an asymmetrical duty to consumers when compared to
their branded competition. To the extent that duty is premised on knowl-
edge, the potential for disparity of knowledge between the branded and
the generic manufacturer creates a potential for disparity in the ability to
protect the consumer. Yet, the pharmaceutical manufacturer-whether
producing branded or generic drugs-is far more knowledgeable than
the consumer. Thus, the purposes of state law can fairly be accomplished
by holding either type of manufacturer liable for harm to the consumer.
B. State Failure-to-Warn Claims, Federal Preemption,
and Pharmaceuticals
In recent years, the courts have debated whether and when state tort
failure-to-warn claims by drug manufacturers are preempted by FDA
regulation. In so doing, many courts have reviewed the conceptual foun-
dations of preemption and have considered the Supreme Court's
preemption jurisprudence.
The foundation of preemption comes from the Constitution. "It is a
familiar and well-established principle that the Supremacy Clause of the
U.S. Constitution invalidates state laws that 'interfere with, or are con-
trary to,' federal law."20 There are three recognized types of federal
preemption of state law under the Supremacy Clause. 2' The first and
more defined type of preemption is known as express preemption. Con-
gress can enact legislation that explicitly reserves the area in question for
18. GLANNON, supra note 14, at 295 (evaluating THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 402A cmt. j and THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCT LIABILITY § 2, cmt. i).
19. Generic manufacturers must demonstrate bioequivalence between the generic prod-
uct and the targeted branded drug product. 21 U.S.C. § 355 (j)(2)(A)(iv) (2009). The generic
manufacturer is not privy to the efficacy and safety data submitted to the FDA as a part of the
branded drug's New Drug Application (NDA).
20. Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 712-13 (1985)
(quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824)).
21. Gaeta v. Perrigo Pharms. Co., 562 F. Supp. 2d 1091, 1095 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
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federal law or regulation, Perhaps predictably, Congress does not fre-
quently expressly preempt state law.23 Thus, parties who seek a
preemption determination typically depend on implied preemption.
Implied preemption can occur in two ways--either through field
preemption or conflict preemption. Field preemption occurs when Con-
gress legislates so comprehensively in a field that there is no need or "no
room" for state law.2 ' Conflict preemption arises when there is room for
state law in a field, but a specific state law conflicts with federal legisla-
tion or regulation in such a way that it is impossible to comply with
both. Preemption jurisprudence acknowledges that, where applicable,
federal regulations, in addition to federal statutes, can preempt state
laws.26 When facing failure-to-warn claims under state law, generic
manufacturers routinely argue that conflict preemption applies, often
conceding that express and field preemption are not at issue with respect
to the FDA's regulations of generic drugs.27
When the Supreme Court considers preemption, the touchstone of
the analysis is congressional intent.2 ' Express preemption then theoreti-
cally entails a standard statutory interpretation. For implied preemption,
"a textualist approach almost by definition fails. ' 29 The Court routinely
appears to reject this failure, instead striving to discern congressional
intent in this context through an interpretive canon known as the pre-
sumption against preemption." Implied preemption often arises in an
area traditionally occupied by states. Under the presumption against pre-
emption, the Court assumes "that the historic police powers of the States
were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear
and manifest purpose of Congress."' When considering congressional
intent in an implied preemption analysis specific to a federal regulation,
the Court relies on the "substance of state and federal law" to evaluate
whether conflict exists.32 The Court has further elaborated on this evalua-
22. For a recent example of the Court recognizing and upholding express preemption,
see Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312 (2008).
23. Sharkey, supra note 3, at 450 (observing that, despite the clear constitutionality of
Congress' express preemption regulation, Congress often "punts" on the issue).
24. Hillsborough County, 471 U.S. at 713.
25. Id. (citing Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43
(1963)).
26. Id.
27. See Mensing v. Wyeth, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 2d 1056 (D. Minn. 2008), rev'd, 588 F.3d
603 (8th Cir. 2009); Gaeta v. Perrigo Pharms. Co., 562 F. Supp. 2d 1091 (N.D. Cal. 2008);
Morris v. Wyeth, Inc., 582 F Supp. 2d 861 (W.D. Ky. 2008).
28. Sharkey, supra note 3, at 455.
29. Id. at 456.
30. Id.
31. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
32. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1200 (2009).
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tion, stating that conflict preemption applies when the state law "stands
as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution" of the purposes of
Congress.33
C. Supreme Court: Preemption and Pharmaceuticals
In 2009 the Court addressed conflict preemption for pharmaceutical
companies facing state tort failure-to-warn claims. The Court concluded
that preemption did not apply to the facts presented in Wyeth v. Levine
and remanded the Colacicco case for further consideration in light of
Levine.
1. Wyeth v. Levine
In Levine,3" the Court considered "whether the FDA's drug labeling
judgments 'preempt state law products liability claims premised on the
theory that different labeling judgments were necessary to make drugs
reasonably safe for use.' , The Court granted certiorari to review the
Vermont Supreme Court's decision, which concluded that federal pre-
emption did not apply to bar state claims based on Wyeth's prescription
drug label.36 The United States Supreme Court affirmed, finding that no
federal preemption applies for drugs like Phenergan, Wyeth's branded
prescription drug.
The Court began its inquiry by considering two cornerstones of a
preemption analysis--Congressional purpose and the presumption
against preemption. The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) sets
forth the requirements for prescription drug labeling. In order "to bolster
consumer protection against harmful products,"38 the FDCA requires the
FDA to review and approve new drugs and the proposed labeling. 39 How-
ever, the Court found that "Congress took care to preserve state law,'
' °
indicating that preemption would only arise for " 'direct and positive
conflict[s]'" with federal law.4' The FDCA lacks any applicable express
language preempting state law,42 so the Court delved into the "substance"
of the applicable statutory and regulatory provisions to evaluate whether
conflict preemption applied.
33. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 873 (2000) (quoting Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
34. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009).
35. Id. at 1193 (quoting Wyeth's petition for certiorari).
36. Wyeth v. Levine, 944 A.2d 179 (Vt. Sup. Ct. 2006).
37. Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1191.
38. Id. at 1199.
39. Id. at 1194-95.
40. Id. at 1196.
41. Id. (quoting the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 202 (1962)).
42. Id. at 1200.
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In response to Wyeth's claims of impossibility, the Court first em-
phasized that federal law allows pharmaceutical manufacturers to change
drug labels to add or strengthen safety warnings.43 Changing the label in
this manner does expose the manufacturer to violations of the misbrand-
ing provisions within the FDCA and FDA regulations." Ultimately, the
Court reasoned, the manufacturer was responsible for its label, "charged
both with crafting an adequate label and with ensuring that its warnings
remain adequate as long as the drug is on the market., 45 Further, there
was no clear evidence in the record that the FDA would have denied a
stronger label.4 6 Therefore, the Court determined that Wyeth could com-
ply with both the FDA regulations and the requirements imposed by a
state law duty.
In response to Wyeth's alternate argument that the state law duty
stood as an obstacle to the purposes and objectives of Congress, the
Court theorized that Congress would have expressly preempted state law
if a real barrier to its objectives existed. 7 Moreover, the controlling fed-
eral law leaves room for state-law judgments to impact the contents of
the label because the FDCA imposes no ceiling on what manufacturers
may include.4'8 The FDA's statements to the contrary are accorded little
merit by the Court, primarily because they represent a recent shift in the
FDA's opinion 49 and are not detailed in any formal notice-and-comment
rulemaking provisions.0 Justice Breyer's concurrence also emphasized
the lack of any specific regulation serving as a regulatory ceiling on la-
beling requirements.5' Until the statutory or regulatory scheme changes,
the Levine decision establishes that conflict preemption does not apply
for branded drugs like Phenergan in state law failure-to-warn claims, or
at least not without some additional record to bolster its preemption
claim. 2
43. Id. at 1196 (referencing the changes being effected (CBE) regulation). For a discus-
sion of CBE regulations see infra Part II.
44. Id. at 1197.
45. Id. at 1198 (referencing 21 C.FR. § 201.80(e) (2009)).
46. Id. at 1198.
47. Id. at 1200.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1202-03.
50. Id. at 1203. The Court recognized that an actual regulation can preempt conflicting
state requirements. Id. at 1200.
51. Id. at 1204 (Breyer, J., concurring).
52. Id. at 1198 (discussing the absence of any evidence that the FDA would prohibit a
modified warning).
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2. Colacicco v. Apotex
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Colacicco v. Apotex and va-
cated and remanded the Third Circuit's decision for reconsideration in
light of the Levine opinion. 3 The Third Circuit's decision broadly con-
sidered whether conflict preemption applied to a prescription drug4 and
concluded that it did.55 The Third Circuit conducted a standard preemp-
tion analysis, considering both the presumption against preemption and
the Congressional purpose. The court then concluded that state law,
rather than creating an impossible compliance scheme, stood as an ob-
stacle to the objectives of Congress.56 To reach this conclusion, the Third
Circuit compared the liability facing the pharmaceutical companies for
misbranded drug products" with the FDA's repeated rejection of a more
specific warning label.58 Additionally, the court afforded deference to the
FDA's position that preemption applied. The opinion noted the policy
implications underlying the FDA's position, namely that " ' [u]nder-use of
a drug based on dissemination of unsubstantiated warnings may deprive
patients of efficacious and possibly lifesaving treatment [and] unsubstan-
tiated warnings would likely reduce the impact of valid warnings.' ,
59
The Third Circuit identified that the facts presented in Colacicco di-
verged from those presented in Levine, primarily because Colacicco
contained strong evidence that the FDA would not allow the label
changes required under state law. Additionally, Colacicco involved a de-
fendant generic pharmaceutical manufacturer. Neither the Levine
decision nor the Third Circuit's Colacicco opinion addressed the unique
regulatory constraints faced by a generic manufacturer.
II. GENERIC PREEMPTION
Today, the federal government oversees food and drug regulation
under the FDCA. In 1984, the Hatch-Waxman Act amended the FDCA,
setting forth specific requirements for the regulation of generic drugs.
53. Colacicco v. Apotex Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1578 (2009).
54. Colacicco v. Apotex Inc., 521 F.3d 253, 257 (3d Cir. 2008) [hereinafter Colacicco].
Colacicco is the consolidation of two Third Circuit District Court cases, McNellis v. Pfizer
Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70844 (D. N.J. Sept. 29, 2006), and Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc.,
432 E Supp. 2d 514 (E.D. Pa. 2006). McNellis dealt only with a branded pharmaceutical
product. Therefore, the analysis herein of the Third Circuit's opinion focuses primarily on the
Colacicco v. Apotex portion of the case as it includes a defendant generic manufacturer.
55. Colacicco, 521 F.3d at 276.
56. Id. at 265-75.
57. Id. at 268 (referencing 21 U.S.C. § 355(d)(7) (2009)).
58. Id. at 269, 271.
59. Id. at 275 (quoting the FDA's amicus brief, Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae at 16-17).
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This section outlines the pharmaceutical regulatory framework and evalu-
ates the requirements for generic drugs in the context of preemption.
A. Regulatory Framework
1. The Approval Process
The FDA is charged with ensuring that drugs reaching the market-
place are safe and effective. 6° In light of this responsibility, the FDA
maintains an application approval process for new drugs. Drug manufac-
turers must receive application approval prior to introducing or
delivering into commerce any new drug.6'
Drug companies seeking to introduce new or patented branded drugs
must file a New Drug Application (NDA). 6' The NDA must include "full
reports of investigations which have been made to show whether or not
such drug is safe for use and whether such drug is effective in use. ' 63 The
NDA also must include the proposed label. 4 While the FDA sets forth
requirements about the form and subject matter of the label,65 the manu-
facturer develops the label warning language based on in-house expertise
and clinical information. The statute emphasizes that the manufacturer's
labeling submission is merely "proposed" labeling, 66 implying that there
may be further edits and revisions between the manufacturer and the
FDA over the final, approved label.
Manufacturers of generic drugs receive approval under a separate
67
statutory provision, which requires submission of an Abbreviated New
Drug Application (ANDA).68 The ANDA sets forth less demanding re-
quirements in response to Congress' recognition that the "NDA process
is costly and timeconsuming [sic]... ,69 Generic manufacturers need
only establish bioequivalence between the generic and branded drug
identified in the ANDA, allowing them to forego all safety and efficacy
clinical work. ° Additionally, generic manufacturers must submit the ge-
60. 21 U.S.C. § 393 (2009).
61. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2009).
62. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (2009).
63. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)(A) (2009).
64. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(l)(F) (2009).
65. Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and
Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3, 922 (Jan. 24, 2006).
66. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)(F) (2009).
67. 21 U.S.C. § 3550) (2009).
68. Presumably, the potential ANDA applicant could file a NDA under 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(b) if it was willing to conduct independent preclinical and clinical testing.
69. Serono Laboraties, Inc. v. Shalala, 158 F.3d 1313, 1316 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
70. Sarah E. Eurek, iBrief, Hatch-Waxman Reform and Accelerated Market Entry of Ge-
neric Drugs: Is Faster Necessarily Better?, 2003 DuKE L. & TECH. REv. 0018, atI 4 (2003).
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neric product's labeling]' The label must duplicate the branded drug's
label; to ensure compliance, the FDA requires the generic manufacturer
to submit the branded drug's packaging along with its own.2 Dissimilar
labeling will result in the FDA's refusal to approve a submitted ANDA.73
Limited exceptions exist to the strict uniformity requirement. Substi-
tutions are allowed to identify a difference in producer. 4 In addition, the
generic manufacturer may petition the FDA for label changes that relate
to differences in "route of administration, dosage form, or strength.""
Specific indications may also be omitted from the label in response to
patent or exclusivity rights of the branded drug. 6 Neither the relevant
statute nor regulations allow for labeling changes for manufacturers to
incorporate stronger warnings.
2. Post-Approval
Following approval, the labeling requirements for branded and ge-
neric drugs continue to remain distinct. The branded drug manufacturer
must revise a label "to include a warning about a clinically significant
hazard as soon as there is reasonable evidence of a casual association
with a drug... . ,77 Under this regulation, known as the Changes Being
Effected (CBE) regulation, the branded manufacturers have some auton-
omy to modify labels for their drugs prior to FDA approval.78 They may
"add or strengthen a contraindication [or] warning" without prior agency
approval 9
Unlike their branded drug counterparts, generic manufacturers have
no authority to make independent labeling changes under the CBE regu-
lation. If the branded drug referenced in the manufacturer's ANDA
changes its warning for any reason, including strengthening its warning,
the generic manufacturer must follow suit.' Absent this single permitted
modification, "there is no statutory or regulatory provision permitting a
71. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(v) (2009).
72. 21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a)(8) (2009).
73. 21 C.F.R. § 314.127(a)(7) (2009).
74. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(v) (2009).
75. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(C) (2009); 21 C.F.R. § 314.93(b) (2009).
76. 21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a)(8)(iv) (2009).
77. 21 C.ER. § 201.57(c)(6)(i) (2009).
78. 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c) (2009); see also discussion of Wyeth v. Levine, supra Part I.
79. 21 C.ER. § 314.70(c)(6)(iii) (2009). The manufacturer must notify the agency of
the change but need not receive approval prior to distribution.
80. FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: REVISING ANDA LABELING FOLLOWING
REVISION OF THE RLD LABELING (2000), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/Guidance
ComplianceRegulatorylnformation/Guidances/ucm072891.pdf [hereinafter GUIDANCE FOR IN-
DUSTRY].
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labeling change to be made without prior FDA approval."8 The CBE
regulation, allowing changes that strengthen or add to a branded drug's
warning label, applies only to drugs approved under a NDA.82 It does not
apply to ANDA holders.83 The FDA confirmed the inapplicability to ge-
neric drugs during the promulgation of the regulations, stating that the
CBE regulation does "not authorize [generic] drug manufacturers to add
new warnings" to the label approved for the branded drug. 
4
3. Withdrawal
The FDA reserves the right to withdraw a drug's approval for a
range of reasons." Immediate withdrawal is appropriate in situations
posing imminent hazard to the public health. Several other provisions
identifying circumstances for withdrawal also stress reasons related to
safety and efficacy concerns. In addition, deficient labeling may be
grounds for withdrawal if "there is a lack of substantial evidence that the
drug will have the effect it purports ... in the labeling .... All these
possible withdrawal scenarios apply equally to NDA and ANDA hold-
ers. 7 Generic manufacturers face an additional threat of withdrawal.
ANDA approval may be withdrawn at any point if the generic drug label
fails to maintain consistency with the branded drug listed in the ANDA,
including failing to update its label when the branded drug's label is
modified.88
81. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 6, Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., 521
F3d 253 (3d Cir. 2008) (No. 06-3107).
82. See Mensing v. Wyeth, Inc., 562 F Supp. 2d 1056, 1064 (D. Minn. 2008), rev'd,
588 F.3d 603(8th Cir. 2009). Even though Subpart C (ANDA) regulations reference 21 CFR
§ 314.70, which contains the CBE regulation, the FDA maintains, "that provision does not
modify the requirement that the drug label for a generic drug must be the same as the label for
the approved innovator drug... " Mensing, 562 F Supp. 2d at 1064. On the eve of publica-
tion of this Note, Mensing was reversed by the Eighth Circuit, which concluded that generic
manufacturers must comply with the CBE regulations given the lack of an express preemption
provision in the Hatch-Waxman Act. Mensing v. Wyeth, Inc., 588 F.3d 603, 607 (8th Cir.
2009). I find the lower court's reasoning to be more persuasive and anticipate other courts to
follow it. Admittedly though, the recent reversal by the Eighth Circuit indicates an increasing
divide over the application of CD regulation to generic manufacturers.
83. Mensing, 562 F. Supp. 2d at 1064.
84. Id. (quoting the FDA on the applicability of CBE regulations to generic drugs); see
also Abbreviated New Drug Application Regulations, Final Rule, 57 Fed. Reg. 17,950, at
17,961, 17,953, 17,955 (April 28, 1992) [hereinafter ANDA Final Rule].
85. 21 U.S.C. § 355(e) (2009).
86. 21 U.S.C. § 355(e)(3) (2009).
87. See ANDA Final Rule, supra note 84, at cmt. 39.
88. 21 C.F.R. § 314.150 (2009). The regulation states that withdrawal is appropriate if
the generic drug label "is no longer consistent" with the listed drug in the ANDA, implicitly
acknowledging the regulation's applicability following approval. 21 C.F.R. § 314.150(b)(10)
(2009). See also ANDA Final Rule, supra note 84, at cmt. 39.
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During the rulemaking notice and comment period, the FDA faced
criticism over this apparent lack of flexibility regarding the generic la-
bel. 9 The FDA responded decidedly, confirming that generics may not
modify the label to "add contraindications, warnings, precautions, ad-
verse reactions, and other safety-related information."9 In light of safety
concerns, the FDA suggested that when an ANDA holder believes a
warning label should be changed or strengthened, it may submit the in-
formation to the FDA, and the FDA "will determine whether the labeling
for the generic and [branded] drugs should be revised."9' The FDA then
made it exceedingly clear that under no circumstances may the generic
manufacturer modify the label autonomously.
92
B. A Generic's Fate-Does Preemption Apply?
Due to the differences between the branded and generic regulatory
requirements, a branded drug preemption analysis is thus not an appro-
priate approach for generic drugs. Using the same framework for
evaluation, however, it is possible to assess how a failure-to-warm claim
against a generic manufacturer might fare under a preemption analysis.
1. Preemption Cornerstones
In enacting the Hatch-Waxman Act, Congress' purpose was to
"make... innovative medicines cheaper and more affordable to the pub-
lic" by encouraging generic competition.93 The Hatch-Waxman Act
changed the pharmaceutical regulatory paradigm by introducing an ap-
plication and oversight process specifically for generic products. Among
the changes, Congress shifted testing responsibility away from the ge-
neric manufacturers, requiring only a demonstration of bioequivalence.4
Permitting ANDA applicants to use the clinical and safety data of the
NDA holder significantly reduced generic drug development costs,
thereby allowing for lower retail prices.95
Given the presumption against preemption, it is critical that Con-
gress chose not to preempt expressly state law when drafting and
enacting the Hatch-Waxman Act. Yet, the provision's absence need not
be conclusive of Congressional intent. Surely, Congress could have
89. ANDA Final Rule, supra note 84, at cmt. 40.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Wansheng Jerry Liu, Balancing Accessibility and Sustainability: How to Achieve
the Dual Objectives of the Hatch- Waxman Act While Resolving Antitrust Issues in Pharmaceu-
tical Patent Settlement Cases, 18 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 441,443 (2008).
94. 21 U.S.C. § 3350) (2009).
95. See Liu, supra note 93, at 448.
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resolved generic preemption explicitly in the Act, but doing so might
have been a politically divisive decision. Often with respect to express
products liability preemption, Congress seeks to "placate both industry
and consumers,'" 96 choosing to "punt" the issue to courts and federal
agencies.9 Without an express preemption provision, generic state tort
liability may only be preempted if it falls within the confines of implied
preemption.
2. Implied Conflict Preemption
Conflict preemption applies if the "substance of state and federal
law" presents an impossible regulatory scheme, or if the state law stands
as an obstacle to congressional purpose.98 Impossibility emerges when
the duties arising from state law obligations make compliance with fed-
eral labeling requirements unachievable.99 State law failure-to-warn
claims are premised on the idea that a manufacturer failed to include a
warning that should have otherwise been included. A manufacturer thus
has an obligation to modify their labels accordingly. The federal statute
establishes a no-more (ceiling) and no-less (floor) framework for generic
labels and dictates the contents of the label, requiring the "same" label as
the branded drug the generic seeks to imitate."l The ANDA requires
submission of the "same" label for approval. Even post approval, no
modifications are permitted by the manufacturer for the generic drug.'
0
'
A generic manufacturer facing obligatory label modifications under state
law would necessarily violate this federal "same" label requirement. The
obligations for the manufacturer to add or modify labels accordingly to
avoid liability in State law tort claims make federal compliance impossi-
ble, and thus directly conflict with the federal law.
State law stands as an obstacle when it conflicts, is contrary to, is in-
consistent with, curtails, or interferes with, among other things, the
purposes and objectives of Congress.' 2 As discussed previously, Con-
gress enacted the Hatch-Waxman Act to ensure consumer accessibility to
cheaper drugs by promoting the introduction of generic substitutes in the
marketplace. Because many of these are prescription drugs, accessibility
96. Sharkey, supra note 3, at 450 n.4 (quoting JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. & AARON D.
TWERSKI, PRODUCTS LIABILITY: PROBLEMS AND PROCESS 424 (5th ed. 2004)).
97. Id.
98. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1201 (2009).
99. Mensing v. Wyeth, Inc., 562 F Supp. 2d 1056, 1058-59 (D. Minn 2008), rev'd, 588
F.3d 603 (8th Cir. 2009).
100. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(v) (2009). Permissible exceptions to the "same" requirement
do not include safety and warning modifications. See supra Part I.A.
101. The CBE regulation allowing branded manufacturers leeway to change labels to
strengthen safety warnings does not apply to generic products. See supra Part H.A.
102. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861, 873 (2000).
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turns in part on physicians' willingness to prescribe these drugs. The
FDA maintains that allowing separate labeling would serve as a deterrent
to doctors, stating that "consistent labeling will assure physicians, health
professionals, and consumers that a generic drug is as safe and effective
as its brand-name counterpart."'10 3 If the FDA's concern about allowing
generic labeling deviations is legitimate, physicians may be less likely to
prescribe generic alternatives. Such deterrence impacts actual availabil-
ity because consumers typically have no other means to purchase many
generic drugs without a physician's prescription. State law obligations to
change labeling present the possibility that a generic manufacturer might
be compelled to depart from its branded counterpart's label language.
Should that deviation result in physicians opting to prescribe the
branded, higher-cost product, the purposes of Congress would be im-
peded.
Additionally, allowing generic labeling changes that add contraindi-
cations and/or strengthen warnings potentially imposes a de facto
requirement on generic manufacturers to conduct or support clinical test-
ing. Once subject to generic competition, branded manufacturers may
face diminished incentives to remain in the marketplace. Most plainly,
their profit margins shift because generic competition prevents monopo-
list pricing. Branded manufacturers will also face continued state tort
liability for potentially faulty labels following the decision in Levine.
This liability, coupled with reduced revenue, could drive branded manu-
facturers to leave the marketplace if it opens them to direct generic
competition. Even if the branded manufacturer decides to stay in the
marketplace at this juncture, it has significantly reduced incentives to
continue clinical testing.'
4
Either way, it is possible that the market for a particular drug could
become devoid of any continued clinical work. Generic manufacturers
facing state obligations to modify warning labels may then be forced to
conduct clinical testing to evaluate drug safety. Costs associated with
this testing will be reflected in the market price, potentially driving up
the selling price of generic products. State law provisions that potentially
force generic clinical testing certainly contravene Congress' purpose of
reducing the clinical burden in order to promote low cost pharmaceuti-
cals.
To receive FDA approval for a generic drug, the manufacturer must
use a label identical to its branded counterpart. Duties arising under state
103. ANDA Final Rule, supra note 84, at cmt. 40.
104. Many incentives that encourage branded pharmaceutical manufacturers to continue
clinical work after approval are tied to additional grants of market exclusivity. Levine may
change this or it may exacerbate it; manufacturers may avoid all unnecessary research in order
to ensure they acquire no knowledge that might need to be disclosed to consumers.
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law that would alter the identical nature of the label make it impossible
for a generic manufacturer to comply with federal law. This paradigm
also creates scenarios that may be directly contrary to achieving the ob-
jectives of Congress. As a result, conflict preemption must apply for
generic manufacturers facing state tort failure-to-warn claims.
C. The FDA's Interpretation
The Levine Court acknowledged that some weight may be given to
an agency's perspective on "the impact of tort law on federal
objectives . . . ,"0' The FDA has long asserted that generic
manufacturers may not modify their drug warning labels. Since
codifying the Hatch-Waxman Act, the FDA has opposed generic
modifications of the branded drug label. '" 6 At that time, the FDA made
clear that even additional warnings were not acceptable under the Act.' 7
The FDA affirmed this position in 2000, stating that it is the
responsibility of the ANDA holder to ensure that the label for the generic
drug remains the same as the label for its branded counterpart over the
entire marketing lifespan of the branded drug.' 8 In 2008, the FDA filed
an amicus brief in Colacicco, further confirming that the generic
manufacturer must at all times conform to the approved labeling of the
branded drug. '°9 As Levine cautioned, the FDA's position is instructive,
not conclusive. The FDA's long-standing view, evinced through repeated
proclamations, clearly indicates that generic manufacturers may not add
contraindications or strengthen warnings. This position makes sure that
generic manufacturers seeking to meet additional labeling requirements
imposed by state law will violate federal requirements, further
demonstrating that preemption should apply.
105. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1201 (2009).
106. ANDA Final Rule, supra note 84, at cmt. 40.
107. Id. at 17,953 (discussing the requirement for the same labeling as the referenced
listed drug even when the requested change entails an additional warning).
108. GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 80, at 5. The FDA also encourages the
ANDA holder to make the change at the "very earliest time possible." Id.
109. Mensing v. Wyeth, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1064 (D. Minn. 2008), rev'd, 588
F.3d 603 (8th Cir. 2009) (citing FDA amicus brief, Brief for the United States as Amicus Cu-
riae). The FDA withdrew the Colacicco amicus brief on April 28, 2009, stating that in light of
the Levine decision, it had not conducted the reexamination of preemption necessary to par-
ticipate in the case. Letter from the Solicitor General to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit (April 28, 2009), available at http://druganddevicelaw.blogspot.com/2009/
04/solicitor-generals-letter-in-colacicco.html. Withdrawing the amicus brief does not necessar-
ily speak to a reversal of the FDA's position on generic preemption since Levine did not
address generic drug products.
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D. Revisited. Supreme Court Preemption and Pharmaceuticals
As discussed in Part II, the Supreme Court directly addressed pre-
emption for pharmaceuticals this term, concluding that conflict
preemption did not apply in a state failure-to-warn claim against a
branded drug. This Note concludes that under the current regulatory
scheme, preemption should apply for generic products. This section re-
visits the Supreme Court decisions for this term to consider their
implications for this issue.
1. Wyeth v. Levine Revisited
Factually, the Levine premise is distinguishable from the question of
generic preemption. Levine did not involve a generic drug manufacturer,
and as a result, the unique regulatory requirements facing a generic
manufacturer were not considered by the Court.
The Supreme Court began its analysis with an examination of con-
gressional purpose. Given that the Levine Court was addressing a
branded drug, it only examined congressional intent as it related to
branded products. Although the FDA regulates both branded drugs and
generic drugs, it does so under separate provisions. As discussed exten-
sively above, Congress expressed a discrete purpose regarding generic
pharmaceuticals by amending the FDCA with the Hatch-Waxman Act.
The Levine discussion of congressional purpose, while generally infor-
mative, cannot be dispositive of Congress' purpose relevant to generic
drugs because it did not-and had no reason to-consider the
Hatch-Waxman Act.
The Court then undertook a detailed look at conflict preemption and
pharmaceutical products. Regarding impossibility, the Court looked di-
rectly to the feasibility of label changes under the CBE regulation.
Generic manufacturers, without access to the CBE or similar regulation,
lack the ability to modify labels without FDA approval. Likewise, the
"responsibility" reasoning of the Court does not apply for generic manu-
facturers. Branded manufacturers are "charged with crafting an adequate
label and... ensuring that [the] warning remain[s] adequate,"" ° whereas
generic manufacturers are charged with demonstrating that their labeling
is the "same" as that of the listed drug' and ensuring that it remains the
same throughout the marketing life of the branded product."' Unlike the
Court's attention to the absence of "clear evidence that the FDA would
not have approved a [label] change,""3 the FDA has been explicit that
110. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1198 (2009).
111. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(v) (2009).
112. GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 80, at 5.
113. Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1198.
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generic manufacturers may not modify or strengthen contraindications
and safety warnings."4 Finally, the Court noted the lack of an affirmative
regulation setting a ceiling on warning labels for branded drugs. Generic
drug regulations establish both a floor and a ceiling for warning labels
by dictating the exact permissible language. "
5
Clearly, the Levine holding neither addresses nor abrogates generic
label conflict preemption.
2. Colacicco v. Apotex Revisited
The Third Circuit remanded the Colacicco case to the district court
for decision. It is worth noting that the Third Circuit's Colacicco opinion
did not directly address generic drug failure-to-warn claims. The court of
appeals did not distinguish between the requirements for branded and
generic drugs and, instead, focused exclusively on the provisions that
applied to the branded defendant drug company. Without predicting how
the district court will rule on remand, the original district court opinion
may serve as a marker that the court foresaw the complexity involved
with generic drug regulations. The district court directly addressed the
issue of generic preemption relative to failure-to-warn claims, finding
that "assigning a duty to include a warning different from [the branded
drug's] approved label inherently conflicts with the FDCA."'" 6
As the record currently stands, the question of generic preemption
has not been resolved. The Supreme Court's ruling, vacating and re-
manding the Colacicco decision, and the subsequent remand by the
Third Circuit are not dispositive on generic preemption because the
Third Circuit holding primarily addressed preemption as it applied to
branded pharmaceuticals.
3. Post-Levine Holdings
Following the Levine decision, a few federal district courts have con-
sidered the generic preemption issue with mixed results. The Western
District of Kentucky held that preemption applied in several generic fail-
ure-to-warn cases."7 In these cases, the court conducted a thorough
analysis of generic preemption for failure-to-warn state tort claims. It
concluded that "federal regulation of brand and generic drug labeling
114. ANDA Final Rule, supra note 84, at cmt. 40.
115. There are both statutory and regulatory provisions requiring the "same" label. See
21 U.S.C. § 355(e) (2009); 21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a)(8) (2009).
116. Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., 432 F Supp. 2d 514, 537 (E.D. Pa. 2006).
117. See Morris v. Wyeth, Inc., No. l:07-CV-176-R, 2009 WL 424590 (W.D. Ky. Feb.
20, 2009); Smith v. Wyeth, Inc., No. 5:07-CV-18-R, 2009 WL 425032 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 20,
2009); Wilson v. Pliva, Inc., No. 3:07-CV-378-R, 2009 WL 425027 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 20, 2009).
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differs significantly.""' The court focused on the permissibility of ge-
neric modifications, stating that while the ANDA holder should notify
the FDA when safety concerns dictate a label change, it is the FDA that
determines when generic labels are revised." 9 The court then further dis-
tinguished this notification requirement by contrasting the generic drug's
"should" notify standard with the branded drug's "must" notify duty.2
Even in the face of this "should" notify standard, the court notes that the
"'agency will not accept [ANDAs] for products with significant changes
in labeling (such as new warnings or precautions) intended to address
newly introduced safety or effectiveness problems not presented by the
listed drug.. . ,,""" The court defers to the FDA's explicit position that
"CBE [label] changes are not available for generic drugs approved under
an abbreviated new drug application .... To the contrary, a generic drug
manufacturer is required to conform to the approved labeling for the
listed drug.' 22
The court concluded by considering the public policy rationale be-
hind the Hatch-Waxman Act and affirming that generic preemption
exists. 23 While acknowledging that a majority of district courts that have
considered this issue have found preemption, 124 the court recognized an
emerging split among lower courts over this issue.12' The district court
then found that the Supreme Court's decision in Levine did not alter the
generic preemption reasoning. 26 Given the difficulty of the decision,
however, the court recommended review by the Sixth Circuit. 27
Other district courts considering generic preemption in a post-Levine
context have come to the opposite conclusion. The Western District of
Oklahoma rejected preemption for generic drugs, reasoning that the
defendant's arguments for preemption were "similar, if not identical"
to the defenses unsuccessfully used in Levine. 28 The Northern District
118. Smith, 2009 WL 425032, at *3.
119. Id. at *4 (referring to the FDA's stated position in ANDA Final Rule, supra note 84,
at 17,961).
120. Id.
121. Id. at *5 (quoting Abbreviated New Drug Application Regulations, 54 Fed. Reg.
28,872, 28,884 (proposed July 10, 1989)).
122. Id. at *6 (quoting Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Ap-
proved Drugs, Biologics, and Medical Devices, 73 Fed. Reg. 2848, 2849 (proposed January
16, 2008)).
123. Id. at *10.
124. Smith v. Wyeth, Inc., No. 5:07-CV-18-R, 2008 WL 4697002, at *5 (W.D. Ky. Oct.
24, 2008) (listing federal district court decisions that consider generic failure-to-warn-
preemption).
125. Smith, 2009 WL 425032 at *2.
126. Smith v. Wyeth, Inc., No. 5:07-CV-18-R, 2009 WL 736208, at *1 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 4,
2009).
127. Id.
128. Schrock v. Wyeth, Inc., 601 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1265 (W.D. Okla. 2009).
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of Illinois acknowledged that Wyeth v. Levine is not controlling on ge-
neric preemption. 2 9 Yet, in light of the "sweeping" language in Levine
and the conclusion that the CBE regulations do apply to generic drugs,
the district court declined to recognize generic preemption as a matter of
law. 3' The Vermont District Court, in considering generic preemption,
focused on the broad applicability of Levine"' and the lack of express
preemption in the Hatch-Waxman Act'32 before concluding that conflict
preemption is not applicable.
The lower court decisions lack uniformity on the issue of generic
preemption. The majority of decisions do indicate, however, that Wyeth
v. Levine is not directly controlling on this issue.
III. IMPLICATIONS OF GENERIC PREEMPTION AND
ALTERNATIVE LIABILITY SCHEMES
State failure-to-warn claims serve to compensate injured consumers
and incentivize industries to produce safe products. 13 Preemption pre-
vents this compensation function for injuries related to generic drugs but
may help keep prices low for consumers. This section considers the im-
plications of generic preemption and briefly identifies two options that
might afford some of the benefits of state tort liability without compro-
mising the goal of cheaper, generic pharmaceuticals.
A. Implications
Because conflict preemption bars liability under state failure-to-warn
claims, generic consumers are left without recourse unless they have a
cause of action against the manufacturer that developed the original la-
bel. Whether liability sounds in negligence or strict liability, the liable
party must be the supplier of the injurious good.' Correspondingly,
courts have declined to extend a branded drug manufacturer's duty to
warn to consumers of its generic counterpart. 3 ' A California state appel-
late court departed from this principle, holding a branded manufacturer
129. Stacel v. Teva Pharms., 620 F. Supp. 2d 899, 904 (N.D. Ill. 2009).
130. Id. at 906.
131. Kellogg v. Wyeth, 612 F. Supp. 2d 437, 439 (D. Vt. 2009) (concluding that the
Supreme Court did not "merely narrowly pars[e] the terms and applicability of the CBE provi-
sion to brand name manufacturers").
132. Id. at 440-41.
133. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1200-01 (2009).
134. VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, KATHRYN KELLY, & DAVID F. PARTLETT, PROSSER, WADE
AND SCHWARTZ'S TORTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 718 (11 th ed. 2005).
135. See Foster v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 29 F.3d 165, 171 (4th Cir. 1994); Colacicco
v. Apotex, Inc., 432 F Supp. 2d 514, 538-39 (E.D. Pa. 2006).
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liable for a generic warning label on the premise that it was foreseeable
that generic consumers would rely on the branded drug's label . How-
ever, a subsequent federal court decision lambasted the California court's
analysis, stating that the decision and foreseeability analysis is contrary
to law and stands in contrast to every other court that has considered this
issue.13 Given product liability principles and the vast majority of judi-
cial precedent, save a singular and heavily criticized California state
court opinion, it is clear that consumers have no recourse for injurious
generic drugs under a failure-to-warn theory.
State tort claims also serve to motivate manufacturers to keep warn-
ing labels current. Because the existing regulatory scheme preempts state
tort claims for generic drug manufacturers, this incentive is lacking for
generic drugs manufacturers. Additionally, the FDA does not require
generic manufacturers to notify the agency when a safety concern arises.
The FDA advises that the manufacturer should contact the agency re-
garding safety related label changes, but there is no formalized process
to ensure the company reports the pertinent information."'
The Levine holding will also likely augment an ANDA holder's in-
terest in maintaining updated safety warnings. Because ANDA holders
are responsible for ensuring that their labels remain identical to the
branded drug referenced in the ANDA,"3 9 the incentive created by Levine
will also help keep generic labels up-to-date. Without the motivation
provided by potential state tort liability, this responsibility will serve as
the primary mechanism to ensure that generic labels adequately warn
about safety risks.
B. Possible Alternative Liability Schemes
Congress passed the Hatch-Waxman Act to make innovative phar-
maceuticals more affordable for consumers by promoting the market
introduction of generic drugs.'4° They did so by establishing different
requirements for generic products. The "same" label requirement
prevents the generic manufacturer from making any changes to the warn-
ing label, thus setting the stage for implied conflict preemption. The
136. Conte v. Wyeth, Inc., 168 Cal. App. 4th 89 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
137. Moretti v. Wyeth, Inc., No. 2:08-cv-00396-JCM-(GWF), 2009 U.S. Dist. Lexis
29550, at *10 (D. Nev. Mar. 20, 2009). The Eighth Circuit recently adopted the Fourth Cir-
cuit's position that "holding name brand manufacturers liable for harm cause by generic
manufacturers 'stretch[es] the concept of foreseeability too far.'" Mensing v. Wyeth, 588 F3d
603, 613 (8th Cir. 2009) (citing Foster v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 29 F.3d 165, 171 (4th Cir.
1994)).
138. ANDA Final Rule, supra note 84, at cmts. 20, 40 (noting the FDA is willing to
consider petitions to change both the listed and generic labels).
139. Guidance for Industry, supra note 80, at 5.
140. Liu, supra note 93, at 443.
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rationale behind the "same" label requirement-generic manufacturers
rely on the safety related clinical testing of the branded drug and thus
should use the warning label based on that testing data-helps drive
cheaper drugs into the marketplace. Generic manufacturers must invest
only in the much more limited bioequivalence testing, substantially re-
ducing costs. Preemption also reduces litigation-related costs.
It appears that the current statutory paradigm allows for either a sys-
tem focused on promoting cheap drugs or a system that welcomes the
safety and compensatory influences of state law. An alternative approach
might be to allow the benefits of state tort claims without opening ge-
neric manufacturers up to liability so extensive that they are unable to
offer low cost drugs. Professor Catherine M. Sharkey posits an option
granting preemption under certain circumstances. She suggests that
when the FDA makes a determination about a specific risk, during or
subsequent to the label's approval, state failure-to-warn claims should be
preempted.14 ' Essentially, if the FDA rejects a proposed warning modifi-
cation or reviews evidence under a mandatory petition but "declines to
require a change, then potential grounds for preemption exist.' '42 Practi-
cally, this may be the equivalent of the clear evidence of agency refusal
standard suggested in Levine. Implementing this model would seem to
entail a regulatory modification requiring generic manufacturers to
notify the FDA about known risks.
The general debate about state law preemption for pharmaceuticals
may be instructive for policymakers as they grapple with deciding
whether generics should receive preemptory protection, especially when
branded drugs do not. Jason C. Miller, in considering a state regulatory
compliance defense that has the same effect as preemption, concluded
that the FDA-approved labels should not be considered defective but ac-
knowledged that preemption leaves injured consumers without any form
of compensation.' 43 Miller proposes a preemption scheme that blocks
private actions for FDA-approved labels, but allows a state Attorney
General to bring suits on behalf of the consumers under certain circum-
stances.'" Implementing this scheme for prescription drugs generally, or
for generic drugs specifically, could strike a better balance between pro-
moting the introduction of low cost drugs in the marketplace and
providing consumer protection from improperly labeled, injurious drugs.
Because conflict preemption does not apply for branded drugs, states can
141. Sharkey, supra note 3, at 513.
142. Id. at 514.
143. Jason C. Miller, Note, When and How to Defer to the FDA: Learning from Michi-
gan's Regulatory Compliance Defense, 15 MICH. TELECORM. TECH. L. REv. 565, 570 (2009).
144. Id. at 171.
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choose whether to adopt a preemption provision.14 1 Since conflict pre-
emption does apply for generic manufacturers, Congress would need to
act before a state could adopt an alternative like the state Attorneys
General model.
CONCLUSION
Despite the much-awaited Supreme Court decision in Wyeth v.
Levine, preemption for generic pharmaceuticals still exists. Levine ad-
dressed conflict preemption of state failure-to-warn claims. After
reviewing the federal law governing pharmaceutical warning labels, the
Court found that pharmaceutical companies could modify their branded
drug warning labels to meet obligations presented by state law. Conse-
quently, conflict preemption does not apply.
In contrast, generic drugs must adopt the identical label employed by
their branded counterparts. The FDA does not allow the generic drug
label to deviate from the branded competitor's at any point during the
approval process or thereafter. As a result, the generic manufacturer is
not at liberty to make changes to its product's warning label. State tort
failure-to-warn claims pose an impossible situation-the generic manu-
facturer cannot comply with both the federal requirements to mirror the
branded drug's label and a state obligation to enhance or modify the la-
bel. Further, Congress eliminated much of the clinical testing
requirements for generic drugs as a measure to ensure that they remain
low cost options for consumers.
Exposing generic drugs to tort liability under state law might push
cautious generic manufacturers to conduct or support safety and efficacy
testing. Conducting this type of research would certainly increase costs
and drug prices, frustrating the purpose of Congress to promote generic
drugs. Conflict preemption applies when it is impossible to comply with
the duties arising out of state and federal law, or when state law stands
as an obstacle to accomplishing the purposes of Congress.1 46 Conflict
preemption applies to generic manufacturers sued under state failure-
to-warn claims, but a change in the law is needed to ensure generic
warning labels are adequate and that consumers injured by generic
drugs are not left without any compensation for their pain, suffering,
and heavy medical expenses.
145. Michigan is the only state that treats a regulatory compliance defense as an irrebut-
table presumption, which operates as absolute immunity for drug manufacturers. Id. at 566-
567.
146. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963).
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